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The guarantee of equal protection of the laws extends to women as well 
as men. Yet for the first 100 years of the Fourteenth Amendment’s life, the 
Supreme Court never found a law unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
discriminated on the basis of sex. Between 1970 and 1980, social movement 
advocacy and brilliant litigation by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and others changed 
our constitutional law.1 Cases beginning with Reed v. Reed2 demonstrated 
that in important respects, sex was like race: familiar justifications for 
excluding women rested on stereotypes that denied individuals the 
opportunity to compete and relegated women to secondary status in 
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1 For an important forthcoming account of the role that Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
arguments on stereotyping played in the emergence of modern sex discrimination law, 
see Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). For an examination of movement arguments 
in popular, legislative, and judicial arenas that shaped the early sex discrimination cases, 
see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 
1943, 1984–2004 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel]; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto 
ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1366–1414 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture]; discussion infra Part III.  
2 404 U.S. 71 (1971).  
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American society.3 Over the course of the decade, the Court extended the 
anti-stereotyping principle from discrimination on the basis of race to 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 
But fidelity to the principle had its limits. In 1974, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 
the Court upheld a California law that provided workers comprehensive 
disability insurance for all temporarily disabling conditions that might 
prevent them from working, except pregnancy.4 Although the plaintiff 
argued that “[a]s with other types of sex discrimination, discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy often results from gross stereotypes and generalizations 
which prove irrational under scrutiny,”5 and although the Court 
acknowledged that pregnancy discrimination might “effect an invidious 
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,”6 the Geduldig 
Court upheld the exclusion, reasoning that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy was not necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.7 When the 
Court tried to apply Geduldig’s rationale to federal employment 
 
3 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) 
(“Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is 
straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities 
of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective 
itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.”); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 
(1979) (holding unconstitutional a policy granting government aid to the children of 
unemployed fathers but not unemployed mothers, explaining that the presumption that 
“the father has the ‘primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ while the 
mother is the ‘center of home and family life,’” is “part of the ‘baggage of sexual 
stereotypes,’” and not a legitimate ground for government-imposed sex classifications 
(citations omitted)); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Legislative classifications 
which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of 
reinforcing the stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special 
protection.”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (characterizing as an invalid 
basis for state action “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of 
females in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas’”); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“There can be no doubt that 
our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, 
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in 
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” (footnote omitted)). See 
generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1213–19 
(5th ed. 2006) (discussing these cases). 
4 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). 
5 Brief for Appellees at 24, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640); see also Brief 
Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 9, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 
(No. 73-640) (submitted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Nancy E. Stanley and arguing that 
“[t]he mythology of pregnancy, however, has resisted rational inspection”). 
6 417 U.S. at 496–97 n.20. 
7 See infra notes 12, 78 & accompanying text. 
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discrimination law in General Electric Corp. v. Gilbert,8 Congress rejected 
the Court’s reasoning and enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 
defining discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the 
basis of sex.9  
Enactment of the PDA, however, did not change the Court’s approach to 
the Constitution—at least not immediately. Supreme Court decisions of the 
1970s do not closely scrutinize the regulation of pregnant women to 
determine whether such regulation is shaped by gender bias.10 For this 
reason, there seems to be little connection between the constitutional sex 
discrimination case law and Roe v. Wade’s holding that states may not 
criminalize abortion.11 
Why do the 1970s cases not fully integrate pregnancy regulation into the 
equal protection framework? Geduldig reasons that laws classifying on the 
basis of pregnancy do not classify on the basis of sex because many—but not 
all—women bear children.12 Other cases view pregnancy as representing the 
 
8 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (holding that a disability benefit plan excluding 
disabilities related to pregnancy was not sex-based discrimination within the meaning of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). 
9 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (“The terms 
‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on 
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes . . . .”). For the debates leading to the PDA’s enactment, 
see Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2012–13. Concerns about sex stereotyping played a 
significant role in Congress’s decision to amend Title VII. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-
948, at 3 (1978) (“[T]he assumption that women will become [pregnant] and leave the 
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the 
discriminatory practices which keep people in low-paying and dead-end jobs.”). 
10 See Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 267–80 
(1992) (discussing “physiological naturalism” in equal protection and due process 
doctrine of the period) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning].  
11 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).  
12 Laws burdening pregnant employees harm only female employees, but the Court 
emphasized that they potentially benefit a group that includes employees of both sexes:  
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this 
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program 
divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant 
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of 
both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members 
of both sexes. 
417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) 
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most fundamental sex difference.13 According to these cases, society is 
justified in treating pregnant women differently than others for reasons of 
self-interest (to save money),14 or for reasons of altruism (to protect the 
unborn).15 The cases do not seriously explore the possibility that traditional 
sex-role stereotyping shapes judgments about functional rationality or 
altruism where matters of pregnancy are concerned. 
In short, the Court’s 1970s cases hold that the antistereotyping principle 
constrains laws that classify by sex, but do not find the principle violated 
where government regulates pregnancy. Our Essay unsettles this familiar 
story by making three points. 
First, we show that in the 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the women’s 
movement argued that the antistereotyping principle applied to pregnancy; 
the movement viewed the regulation of pregnant women as a paradigmatic 
site of sex-role stereotyping. Second, we show that even though the Court 
initially had difficulty seeing that sex role stereotypes were sometimes 
implicated in cases concerning the regulation of pregnancy, the Court’s 
constitutional decisions have increasingly come to recognize the relationship 
between pregnancy discrimination and sex discrimination. Third, we suggest 
that the Court and other constitutional interpreters should revisit Geduldig 
and read the decision’s holding more precisely—and narrowly—as 
recognizing that, while there are legitimate reasons for regulating pregnancy, 
such regulation can be animated by invidious or traditionally stereotypical 
judgments. This understanding has implications for both equal protection and 
reproductive rights cases.  
 
13 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“[T]here are differences between males and females that the Constitution 
necessarily recognizes. In this case we deal with the most basic of these differences: 
females can become pregnant as the result of sexual intercourse; males cannot.”). 
14 See, e.g., Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 (noting that California has a legitimate 
interest “in distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments 
at an adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities 
inadequately,” and in “maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly 
burden participating employees, particularly low-income employees who may be most in 
need of the disability insurance”).  
15 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (explaining that at viability, “the State’s important 
and legitimate interest in potential life” becomes “‘compelling’” and therefore sufficient 
to justify treating pregnant women differently, by abrogating their right to choose 
whether to bear a child). 
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I. PREGNANCY AND THE ANTISTEREOTYPING PRINCIPLE: THE 1970S 
In the 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the women’s movement 
challenged laws that imposed traditional sex roles on pregnant women.16 We 
discuss two legal documents of the era, each written in 1972. This was the 
year the Equal Rights Amendment was sent to the states for ratification, and 
when the women’s movement was still trying to persuade the Court to apply 
heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. 
A. Struck v. Secretary of Defense 
The first document is a brief that Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote as general 
counsel for the Women’s Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) in Struck v. Secretary of Defense.17 Captain Susan Struck 
was a career officer serving as a nurse in Vietnam who faced an involuntary 
discharge under Air Force regulations then in effect because she was 
pregnant.18 Government regulations barred both pregnant women and 
mothers from serving.19 The only way for Struck to keep her job was to abort 
 
16 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 1, at 1385–86 & nn.169–70 (discussing 
feminists in the early 1970s who argued that, under the Equal Protection Clause and 
federal employment discrimination law, regulation of pregnancy was sex-based and 
wrongful when it enforced traditional stereotypes about women’s roles). A number of 
decisionmakers responded favorably to this claim. For example, in 1972, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that disability relating to pregnancy 
should be treated as any other disability at work. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973) 
(providing that an employer’s general disability policies “shall be applied to disability 
due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to 
other temporary disabilities”). And courts began to recognize that mandatory discharge of 
pregnant women violated equal protection. See Heath v. Westerville Board of Education, 
345 F. Supp. 501, 505 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1972), which relied on Reed to invalidate 
regulations requiring termination of employment at a fixed stage of pregnancy and 
explained that the “defendant Board’s . . . treatment of pregnancy . . . is more a 
manifestation of cultural sex role conditioning than a response to medical fact and 
necessity. The fact that [the plaintiff] does not fit neatly into the stereotyped vision . . . of 
the ‘correct’ female response to pregnancy should not redound to her economic or 
professional detriment.” 
17 See Brief for Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-
178), 1972 WL 135840. For a detailed analysis of this brief and what it reveals about 
Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination, see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. 
Siegel, Struck By Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex 
Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010).  
18 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 3.  
19 Id. at 5. The regulation stated: 
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the pregnancy.20 No policies similarly required discharge of men who 
fathered children while in the service.21 Ginsburg’s 1972 brief challenged the 
exclusion as a violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, 
insisting that government regulation of pregnant women was presumptively 
unconstitutional when such regulation enforced the sex roles and stereotypes 
of the separate-spheres tradition—the dyadic structuring of sex roles in 
which men are expected to perform as breadwinners and women are expected 
to perform as economically dependent caregivers.22 Ginsburg argued that 
“[s]ex discrimination exists when all or a defined class of women (or men) 
are subjected to disadvantaged treatment based on stereotypical assumptions 
that operate to foreclose opportunity based on individual merit,” and she 
urged that the pregnancy regulation at bar should be subject to “close 
scrutiny, identifying sex as a ‘suspect’ criterion for governmental 
distinctions.”23 
Ginsburg identified discharge-for-pregnancy rules as a paradigmatic 
form of the particular kind of sex-based differentiation the feminist 
movement was challenging.24 Her brief demonstrated that exclusion of 
 
The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least practical 
delay when it is determined that one of the conditions in (a) or (b) below exist . . . 
a. Pregnancy: 
(1) General: 
(a) A woman will be discharged from the service with the least practical 
delay when a determination is made by a medical officer that she is 
pregnant. 
 . . .  
a. Minor Children: 
(1) General: The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the 
least practical delay when it is established that she:  
 . . .  
(d) Has given birth to a living child while in a commissioned officer 
status. 
Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Air Force 
Regulation 36-12). A 1971 amendment to the regulation provided that “Discharge Action 
will be cancelled if Pregnancy is Terminated.” Id. at 1376 (quoting Part I, C of 1971 
Amendments to Regulations). 
20 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 10.  
21 Id. at 7. 
22 Id. at 12–14. 
23 Id. at 15, 26. 
24 Ginsburg wrote:  
In very recent years, a new appreciation of women’s place has been generated 
in the United States. Activated by feminists of both sexes, legislatures and courts 
have begun to recognize and respond to the subordinate position of women in our 
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pregnant employees was sex-based state action that enforced traditional sex 
roles. “Heading the list of arbitrary barriers that have plagued women 
seeking equal opportunity is disadvantaged treatment based on their unique 
childbearing function.”25 Mandatory discharge of employees who became 
pregnant not only inflicted substantial economic harm; it also imposed 
traditional social roles on women. “[M]andatory pregnancy discharge,” 
Ginsburg contended, “reinforces societal pressure to relinquish career 
aspirations for a hearth-centered existence.”26  
To make visible the role-based assumptions the discharge rules enforced, 
Ginsburg compared the government’s treatment of women in the service to 
its treatment of men. She showed that the Air Force accommodated service 
members temporarily disabled for reasons other than pregnancy,27 and 
affirmatively sought to retain men who became fathers. “[M]en in the Air 
Force are not constrained to avoid the pleasures and responsibilities of 
procreation and parenthood”28 and “indeed additional benefits are provided 
to encourage men who become fathers to remain in service.”29 By contrast, 
Ginsburg emphasized, Captain Struck “was presumed unfit for service under 
a regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits into the 
stereotyped vision of the correct female response to pregnancy.”30  
Ginsburg rejected the long line of cases that justified different treatment 
of women as benign protection. Laws enforcing the sex roles of the separate 
spheres tradition did not in fact protect women; they locked women in a 
social order that denied them the opportunity to define themselves as 
individuals and subordinated them by making them dependents and second-
class participants in core activities of citizenship. “[P]resumably well-
meaning exaltation of woman’s unique role in bearing children has, in effect, 
denied women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and 
capacities and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in 
 
society and the second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon 
them. The heightened national awareness that equal opportunity for men and women 
is a matter of simple justice has led to significant reform . . . . 
Id. at 26–27 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
25 Id. at 34. 
26 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 10; see also infra note 35. 
27 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 23, 50. 
28 Id. at 48. 
29 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 55. 
30 Id. at 50–51 (quoting Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 
506 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (internal quotation omitted); see also id. at 52 (“The 
discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited 
notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at 
home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.” (footnote omitted)). 
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society.”31 Ginsburg thus argued that the Equal Protection Clause requires 
government to give women equal freedom with men to define themselves. 
The Struck brief challenged the mandatory discharge rule as violating 
constitutional guarantees of privacy as well as equality. In a separate section, 
Ginsburg urged that “[i]mposition of this outmoded standard upon petitioner 
unconstitutionally encroaches upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her 
personal life.”32 Privacy doctrine protects the freedom to define one’s family 
life that equal protection also protects when it prohibits government from 
enforcing traditional sex roles on women.  
Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut33 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,34 
Ginsburg argued that Air Force policy enforced the “discredited notion that a 
woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at 
home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.”35 In so 
doing, the policy “substantially infring[ed] upon her right to sexual privacy, 
and her autonomy in deciding ‘whether to bear . . . a child.’”36 Ginsburg 
cited a series of lower court opinions that understood Griswold and 
Eisenstadt to protect decisions about abortion.37 She thereby intimated that 
the cases protecting women’s decisions whether to bear a child extend to 
abortion—that those cases prohibit not only laws that require women to 
continue a pregnancy,38 but also laws that pressure women to end a 
pregnancy, as did the Air Force regulation Struck challenged.39  
Ginsburg argued that the Constitution protected Struck’s decision about 
how to reconcile work and family from government control on equal 
protection, privacy, and free exercise grounds. Ginsburg thus showed how 
 
31 See id. at 38–45 (discussing, inter alia, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); 
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)). 
32 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 52. 
33 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
34 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
35 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 52 (footnote omitted). 
36 Id. at 54 (quoting Baird, 405 U.S. at 453). 
37 Id. at 54 n.55. Ginsburg explained that “Griswold alone, or in conjunction with 
Baird, has been cited in numerous lower court decisions holding that women have a right 
to determine for themselves, free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether or 
not to bear children,” and listed the following cases as examples: Roe v. Wade, 314 
F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); 
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972); and YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 
1048 (D. N.J. 1972). 
38 Notably, Ginsburg filed the Struck brief on December 4, 1972. Roe was handed 
down on January 22, 1973. 
39 See supra note 19 (quoting the Air Force regulation). 
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the Air Force regulation subjected Struck to several constitutionally suspect 
forms of pressure, concluding “that the challenged regulation operates with 
particularly brutal force against women of [Captain Struck’s Roman 
Catholic] faith.”40 This was because “[t]ermination of pregnancy prior to the 
birth of a living child was not an option [she] could choose.”41 In sum, “the 
regulation pitted her Air Force career against . . . her religious conscience.”42  
The Supreme Court never heard oral argument. During litigation, the Air 
Force waived Captain Struck’s discharge, retreating from its policy of 
automatically discharging women for pregnancy,43 and Solicitor General 
Erwin Griswold moved to dismiss the case as moot.44 The Court elected to 
vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider 
[the] issue of mootness in light of the position presently asserted by the 
Government.”45 
B. Abele v. Markle 
In the 1970s, the women’s movement challenged not only mandatory 
discharge rules, but also laws criminalizing abortion as imposing sex roles on 
women.46 Feminists argued that “[r]estrictive laws governing 
abortion . . . are a manifestation of the fact that men are unable to see women 
 
40 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 56. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 We have not been able to determine why Griswold feared a Supreme Court 
decision on the merits in Struck. We strongly suspect, however, that he perceived 
governmental coercion of abortion as an inadvisable context in which to vindicate the 
federal government’s asserted interests in the area of pregnancy discrimination. The 
context of Struck was very much one of coercion. See, e.g., Janice Goodman, Rhonda 
Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe, Where Do We Go From Here?, 1 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 20, 35 (1973) (discussing Struck as a case arising “[i]n the area of 
coercion”). 
44 For Ginsburg’s response to the motion, see Opposition to Memorandum for the 
Respondents Suggesting Mootness, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 
72-178), 1972 WL 135842.  
45 Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071. 
46 On sex equality arguments for the abortion right in this era, see Reva B. Siegel, 
Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving 
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 825 (2007) (“Whether making claims on 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or the Nineteenth Amendment, 
briefs argued that criminal laws forcing pregnant women to bear unwanted children were 
the expression of sex stereotyping and sex-role reasoning.”) [hereinafter Siegel, Sex 
Equality Arguments]. See generally Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, On The Road to 
Roe v. Wade: How Americans Talked About Abortion in the Years Before the Supreme 
Court’s Landmark Ruling (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author). 
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in any role other than that of mother and wife.”47 In Abele v. Markle, a suit 
challenging Connecticut’s abortion law which Ginsburg cited in her Struck 
brief,48 one can see the antistereotyping principle applied to abortion laws. 
What follows is an excerpt from a decision by Judge Edward Lumbard 
striking down Connecticut’s statute. He wrote the opinion in 1972, the same 
year as the Struck brief. The decision reasons about the unconstitutionality of 
Connecticut’s abortion restrictions differently than the Court would a year 
later in Roe: 
The Connecticut anti-abortion laws take from women the power to 
determine whether or not to have a child once conception has occurred. In 
1860, when these statutes were enacted in their present form, women had 
few rights. Since then, however, their status in our society has changed 
dramatically. From being wholly excluded from political matters, they have 
secured full access to the political arena. From the home, they have moved 
into industry; now some 30 million women comprise forty percent of the 
work force. And as women’s roles have changed, so have societal attitudes. 
The recently passed equal rights statute and the pending equal rights 
amendment demonstrate that society now considers women the equal of 
men. 
The changed role of women in society and the changed attitudes toward 
them reflect the societal judgment that women can competently order their 
own lives and that they are the appropriate decisionmakers about matters 
affecting their fundamental concerns.49 
These brief paragraphs were penned the year before Justice Brennan 
made the case for extending heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination in 
 
47 Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers et al. at 24, Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40); see also CONGRESS TO UNITE WOMEN, 
RESOLUTIONS FROM THE WORKSHOP ON REPRODUCTION AND ITS CONTROL (pamphlet) 
(1969) (“We support the teaching of sex education to people of all ages, and demand that 
this sex education include instruction in all aspects of birth control and EXCLUDE 
instruction in so-called ‘sex roles.’”); Mary Daly, Sexist Ethics and Abortion, in Female 
Liberation, The Right to Choose Abortion 21, 21 (1971) (“Writings on abortion by male 
ethicists often give the illusion of ‘clarity’ because they concentrate upon some selected 
facts or data, while failing to consider the social context of the abortion problem—the 
assumptions, attitudes, stereotypes, customs, and arrangements which make up the fabric 
of the world in which women actually live.”); WOMEN VERSUS CONNECTICUT 2–3 
(pamphlet) (1970) (“We believe that women must unite to free themselves from a culture 
that defines them only as daughters, wives and mothers. We must be free to be human 
whether or not we choose to marry or bear children.”). 
48 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 54 n.55. 
49 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Conn. 1972) (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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Frontiero v. Richardson50 and Justice Blackmun struck down Texas’s 
abortion law in Roe.51 In Abele, Judge Lumbard reasoned that constitutional 
protection for women’s decision whether to abort a pregnancy was warranted 
because of changing social views about women’s “status” and “roles.”52 He 
cited the Nineteenth Amendment’s conferring on women the right to vote; 
Reed v. Reed, the first equal protection sex discrimination decision; Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (as amended in 1972, when Congress insisted 
on equal enforcement of sex as well as race provisions of the federal 
employment discrimination law); and the Equal Rights Amendment, which 
had just been sent to the states.53 Given changing social understanding of 
women’s “status” and “roles,”54 Judge Lumbard decided that the state’s 
interest in protecting the unborn was not a sufficient reason to take away 
from women all control over the decision whether to become a mother.55 
Suffice it to say, these are not the reasons or forms of authority to which 
the Court appealed when it recognized women’s right to choose in Roe.56 
Supreme Court decisions of the 1970s did not closely scrutinize claims of 
pregnancy discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and failed to 
recognize equal protection as a ground for the abortion right. But after some 
thirty-five years of continuing argument—in the litigation of pregnancy 
discrimination cases, in legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave 
 
50 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
51 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
52 342 F. Supp. at 802. 
53 Id. at 802 & nn.8–9. Judge Lumbard did not expressly cite the Equal Protection 
Clause; instead, he cited Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the first equal protection 
decision to strike down a law on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of sex—a 
case briefed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See Reply Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).  
54 Abele, 342 F. Supp. at 802.  
55 Id. at 802–03. 
56 The Roe Court more than once described the abortion right as residing with the 
pregnant woman’s physician. The Court noted that for the period of pregnancy prior to 
the “compelling” point, “the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free 
to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s 
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be 
effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.” 410 U.S. at 163. The Court 
later explained that “[f]or the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, 
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician.” Id. at 164. For other sources noting this point, 
see Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications 
of a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 45–46 (2008); Siegel, Reasoning, 
supra note 10, at 273 n.43; Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims 
That Engendered Roe (Mar. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  




                                                                                                                  
Act (FMLA),57 and in debate over abortion rights—the law is slowly 
beginning to shift today.  
II. INCREMENTAL CHANGE: EMERGENT ANTISTEREOTYPING 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE REGULATION OF PREGNANCY 
We will not attempt here to document exhaustively our claim that the 
Court—as well as American society—has been proceeding on a path of 
incremental change. Rather, we will identify two locations in Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine in which we can now see the antistereotyping principle 
applied to the regulation of pregnancy. 
A. Equal Protection 
In 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of a six-Justice majority, 
applied the antistereotyping principle to the regulation of pregnancy in 
upholding the FMLA in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs.58 To demonstrate that Congress had power to enact the FMLA under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a remedy for violations of the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Hibbs opinion discussed at length evidence 
before Congress of equal protection violations that Congress could remedy 
by enacting the FMLA.59 Chief Justice Rehnquist reported that states often 
gave leave to women only, but the extended time off for childbearing 
included leave for early childcare that men, too, might have used for 
parenting purposes.60 Rehnquist o
Many States offered women extended “maternity” leave that far exceeded 
the typical 4- to 8-week period of physical disability due to pregnancy and 
childbirth, but very few States granted men a parallel benefit: Fifteen States 
provided women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only 
four provided men with the same. This and other differential leave policies 
were not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, 
but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work.61  
Where states offered female employees leave for “pregnancy disability” 
that far exceeded the medically recommended pregnancy disability leave 
 
57 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
58 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003). 
59 Id. at 730.  
60 Id. at 731. 
61 Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
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period of six weeks, the Court in Hibbs reasoned, “[t]his gender-
discriminatory policy is not attributable to any different physical needs of 
men and women, but rather to the invalid stereotypes that Congress sought to 
counter through the FMLA.”62 The length of the “pregnancy disability” 
leave reflected and enforced stereotypical assumptions about women’s 
distinctive obligations a
Quoting Congress, the Court observed: “Historically, denial or 
curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been traceable 
directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and 
workers second. This prevailing ideology about women’s roles has in turn 
justified discrimination against women when they are mothers or mothers-to-
be.”63 In this passage, the Court acknowledged what its earlier analysis 
demonstrated and the women’s movement had long argued: that 
unconstitutional sex stereotyping has shaped laws governing pregnant 
women as well as new mothers.64  
B. Abortion Rights 
Hibbs applied the antistereotyping principle to the regulation of 
pregnancy. The same is true of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,65 the Court’s 1992 decision reaffirming Roe. The 
joint opinion in Casey did not invoke equal protection as textual or doctrinal 
authority for the abortion right, but it repeatedly invoked sex equality 
concepts to explain the values the abortion right protects and to determine the 
reach of the right. Consider the language in which the joint opinion 
reaffirmed constitutional protection for the abortion right: 
 
62 Id. at 733 n.6. 
63 Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
64 Then Court then observed that sex-role stereotyping shapes the regulation of 
men’s conduct as well as that of women: 
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel 
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because 
employers continued to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied 
men similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These 
mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that 
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and 
fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and 
their value as employees. Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to 
subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis. 
Id.  
65 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without 
more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that 
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of 
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her 
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.66 
Precisely as it reaffirmed the abortion right, the joint opinion summoned 
the understanding that the state cannot impose “its own vision of the 
woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our 
history and our culture.”67 The opinion tied constitutional protection for 
women’s abortion decision to the understanding, forged in the Court’s sex 
discrimination cases, that government may not use law to enforce traditional 
sex roles on women.68 As one of us has written, the joint opinion expresses 
“constitutional limitations on abortion laws in the language of [the Court’s] 
equal protection sex discrimination opinions, illuminating liberty concerns at 
 
66 Id. at 852. 
67 Id.  
68 In Casey, the Court invoked concerns about government enforcement of 
traditional sex roles not only in explaining the rationale of the abortion right, but also in 
explaining its reach. Casey struck down the spousal notice requirement of Pennsylvania’s 
abortion law on the ground that it imposed traditional sex roles on women: 
There was a time, not so long ago, when a different understanding of the family 
and of the Constitution prevailed. In Bradwell v. State, three Members of this Court 
reaffirmed the common-law principle that “a woman had no legal existence separate 
from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social 
state . . . .” Only one generation has passed since this Court observed that “woman is 
still regarded as the center of home and family life,” with attendant “special 
responsibilities” that precluded full and independent legal status under the 
Constitution. These views, of course, are no longer consistent with our 
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution. . . . 
The husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not 
permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his 
wife. The contrary view leads to consequences reminiscent of the common law. . . . 
A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents 
exercise over their children.  
Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law 
status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and 
of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their 
constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all 
individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental 
power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of 
the individual’s family. 
Id. at 896–98 (citation omitted). 
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the heart of the sex equality cases in the very act of recognizing equality 
concerns at the root of its liberty cases.”69 
Justice Ginsburg quoted Casey’s sex equality reasoning in her dissent in 
Gonzales v. Carhart.70 But she went even further. Where Casey drew upon 
sex equality principles to justify the abortion right—reasoning that 
government may not use the power of the state to enforce traditional sex 
roles on women—Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent added a discussion of 
key equal protection sex discrimination precedents, including decisions 
Justice Ginsburg litigated or wrote.71 In her Carhart dissent, Justice 
 
69 Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments, supra note 46, at 831. 
70 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see, e.g., id. at 170 (“In 
reaffirming Roe, the Casey Court described the centrality of ‘the decision whether to 
bear . . . a child,’ to a woman’s ‘dignity and autonomy,’ her ‘personhood’ and ‘destiny,’ 
her ‘conception of . . . her place in society.’”(citations omitted)); id. at 171 (“As Casey 
comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control 
over her [own] destiny.’. . . Women, it is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, 
and right ‘to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.’ Their 
ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to 
‘their ability to control their reproductive lives.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 172 (“[L]egal 
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some 
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine 
her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”); id. at 171 n.2 (“Casey 
described more precisely than did Roe v. Wade the impact of abortion restrictions on 
women’s liberty.” (citations omitted)); id. at 185 (citing Casey as evidence of the Court’s 
repeated confirmation “that ‘[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped . . . on her own 
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.’”). 
71 In objecting to the forms of woman-protective antiabortion arguments to which 
the Carhart majority referred, Justice Ginsburg invoked both negative and positive equal 
protection precedents—that is, the cases invalidated by modern understandings of sex 
discrimination, as well as the equal protection decisions that reflect this new 
understanding of women’s roles as citizens:  
This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family 
and under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited. Compare, 
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–423, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908) 
(“protective” legislation imposing hours-of-work limitations on women only held 
permissible in view of women’s “physical structure and a proper discharge of her 
maternal functio[n]”) and Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141, 21 L. Ed. 442 
(1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and 
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female 
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother.”), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n.12, 116 
S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996) (State may not rely on “overbroad 
generalizations” about the “talents, capacities, or preferences” of women; “[s]uch 
judgments have . . . impeded . . . women’s progress toward full citizenship stature 
throughout our Nation’s history”), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207, 97 
S. Ct. 1021, 51 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1977) (gender-based Social Security classification 
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Ginsburg, joined in full by three other Justices, fused the normative power of 
equality arguments with the textual authority of the Equal Protection Clause: 
“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek 
to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a 
woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal 
citizenship stature.”72 In responding to the majority’s discussion of woman-
protective antiabortion argument, Justice Ginsburg reminded her audience of 
Bradwell73 and other precedents enforcing traditional sex roles that the 
nation now repudiates. This audience includes Justice Kennedy, who enabled 
Casey and who reaffirmed its framework and protection for second-trimester 
abortions in Carhart.74  
 
rejected because it rested on “archaic and overbroad generalizations” “such as 
assumptions as to [women’s] dependency” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
72 Ginsburg clarified the true stakes surrounding abortion-restrictive regulation of 
women:  
There was a time, not so long ago, when women were regarded as the center of 
home and family life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and 
independent legal status under the Constitution. Those views, this Court made clear 
in Casey, are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the 
individual, or the Constitution. Women, it is now acknowledged, have the talent, 
capacity, and right to participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation. Their ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately 
connected to their ability to control their reproductive lives. Thus, legal challenges 
to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some 
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature. 
Id. at 171–72 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For an account of Justice 
Ginsburg’s constitutional vision that centers on her commitment to equal citizenship 
stature and explores the diverse doctrinal implications of this commitment, see generally 
Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision in 
President Obama’s America, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (symposium 
honoring the jurisprudence of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
73 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
74 In Carhart, Justice Kennedy applied Casey, which he understood to mandate 
protection for the most common method of second-trimester abortion. What is more, 
Kennedy did not understand the Court to be limiting a woman’s autonomy to decide 
whether to have an abortion. Rather, he wrote as if the only question presented was the 
method through which physicians would make the women’s decision effective. See Reva 
B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1770–71 (2008). 
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III. GEDULDIG IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
As we have seen, today there are both equal protection and substantive 
due process decisions that apply the antistereotyping principle to laws 
regulating pregnancy. These decisions reflect incremental—but cumulatively 
substantial—changes in the way Americans view the relationship between 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and discrimination on the basis of 
sex.75 It is now time to reexamine the ways we read Geduldig v. Aiello.76  
Geduldig has long been read as a constitutional impediment to pregnancy 
discrimination claims.77 But what exactly did Geduldig say? We quote part 
of Geduldig’s now infamous footnote 20: 
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow 
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based 
 
75 Consider, for example, the political impossibility of repealing the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which responded to Geduldig and 
Gilbert. The Court recently discussed this case law and Congress’s responses to it in 
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009). There the Court held that an employer 
does not necessarily violate the PDA when it pays pension benefits based in part on an 
accrual rule, applied only prior to the PDA’s enactment, that gave less retirement credit 
for pregnancy leave than for medical leave generally. Id. at 1968. Only Justice Breyer 
joined Justice Ginsburg’s passionate dissent, in which she described Gilbert as wrong the 
day it was decided; she characterized the decision as “astonishing” and “aberrational,” 
and stated that “this Court erred egregiously.” Id. at 1977, 1979 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
The other justices allowed AT&T to perpetuate pay differentials in the post-PDA period 
that were attributable to pregnancy discrimination that occurred in the pre-PDA period. 
Id. at 1966 (majority opinion). Tellingly, however, none of them defended Geduldig and 
Gilbert’s reasoning. In essence, the majority reasoned that the employer’s discrimination 
was reasonable when it occurred, even if it was no longer an acceptable way to treat 
women. Ginsburg’s characterization of Gilbert provoked no defense of the decision from 
any other Justice. This is in stark contrast to what commonly occurs when individual 
Justices speak their minds forcefully in controversial areas of law. Both the narrow 
holding and the loud silences in Hulteen suggest little enthusiasm on the Court for 
defending the Geduldig/Gilbert view of the relation between pregnancy discrimination 
and sex discrimination. 
76 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
77 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 751 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Geduldig for the proposition that “[o]ur cases make clear 
that a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by granting pregnancy disability 
leave to women without providing for a grant of parenting leave to men”); Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993) (noting that in Geduldig, 
“we rejected the claim that a state disability insurance system that denied coverage to 
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy [violated the Fourteenth Amendment]. 
‘While it is true,’ we said, ‘that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that 
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.’” 
(citation omitted)).  




                                                                                                                  
classification like those considered in [Reed and Frontiero]. Normal 
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique 
characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are 
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the 
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to 
include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this 
on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical 
condition.78 
As the language of the Court’s opinion makes clear, Geduldig did not 
hold that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is never discrimination on 
the basis of sex; rather, Geduldig held that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy is not always discrimination on the basis of sex. Far from 
imposing a categorical bar to constitutional claims of pregnancy 
discrimination, Geduldig acknowledged that “distinctions involving 
pregnancy” might inflict “an invidious discrimination against the members of 
one sex or the other.”79 The Court concluded, however, that the principle 
was respected in that ca
Geduldig did not recognize gender bias in the decision of the California 
legislature to provide temporary disability insurance for most work-disabling 
conditions except pregnancy. In the early 1970s, the Court viewed as rational 
the legislature’s decision to save money by excluding the claims of new 
mothers and mothers-to-be.80 But over the course of the decade, not just the 
feminist movement, but Congress itself condemned practices imposing 
traditional sex-role constraints on pregnant women in the workplace.81 With 
the benefit of several decades of PDA litigation, the nation has come to 
recognize that employment decisions that appear grounded in functional 
rationality may instead reflect archaic and stereotypical conceptions of 
women’s roles. If Geduldig recognized this possibility in principle, Hibbs 
pronounced its violation in practice.  
In the early 1970s, the Court prohibited abortion restrictions under the 
Due Process Clause without exploring how criminal abortion statutes might 
also violate principles of equal protection. But, over time equal protection 
values have come to shape substantive due process law. Several passages of 
Casey recognize that constitutional restrictions on abortion also protect 
pregnant women against state action enforcing traditional conceptions of 
women’s roles. In Carhart, four members of the Court directly invoke the 
 
78 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974).  
79 Id. 
80 See supra note 13 (quoting the Court’s reasoning). 
81 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the PDA). 
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authority of the Equal Protection Clause in reasoning about the 
constitutionally of abortion-restrictive regulation.  
Where the Court was once inclined to view the regulation of pregnant 
women as presumptively benign, the Court is now more quick to recognize 
constitutional concerns at stake in the law’s regulation of pregnant women. 
Equal protection and due process law today require scrutiny of laws 
governing pregnancy to ensure that exercises of public power aimed at 
pregnant women, however benign in purpose, are not in fact shaped by 
gender bias. What Geduldig anticipates in theory, Hibbs and Casey illustrate 
in practice. As Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent cautions, when regulation 
of pregnant women reflects or enforces sex-role stereotypes of the separate 
spheres’ tradition, the law may violate equal protection.82 
 
82 For development of this argument, see generally Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come 
aLong Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1891–97 (2006). 
